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In the first half of my dissertation, I estimate the causal effect of a first child on female labor
supply. This is a difficult task given the endogeneity of the fertility decision. Ideally, this question
could be answered by running a social experiment where women are randomly assigned children or
not. Using field data from the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), I mimic this hypothetic
experiment by focusing on a sample of women that sought help to become pregnant. After a certain
period since they started receiving help, only some of these women are successful. In this instance,
fertility appears to be exogenous to labor supply in that pre-treatment labor supply is uncorrelated
with subsequent fertility. Using this strategy, I estimate that having a first child younger than a
year old reduces female labor supply by 26.3 percentage points. These estimates are close to OLS
and fixed-effects estimates obtained from a panel data constructed from the NSFG. They are also
close to OLS estimates obtained using similarly defined samples from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses.
The second part of my dissertation explores the problem of an educational authority who
decides his revelation policy about students educational attainments in order to maximize mean
educational achievement. Incentives in an educational context are different from those in the
marketplace. Schools cannot pay students to motivate them to attain higher levels of education.
However, there is still a role for incentives. Since students care about which signal they can get
from the school (pass/fail, GPA), the school has a tool to influence students’ behavior. Using
a theoretical model, I explore the optimal way to use this tool, i.e., the optimal way to reveal
educational achievements. I find that this optimal revelation policy is dependent on the distribution
of students with respect to ability. I show that this optimal scheme could be: a) classify individuals
in two groups and just reveal this information, b) reveal all information, c) set a critical standard
and group all individuals together below this level and provide full information about students’
productivity above it.
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The first half of this dissertation explores how women adjust their employment decisions
to the arrival of a child. Estimating the effect of fertility on female labor supply has been a long
standing question in economics. In fact, hundreds of studies have aimed to answer this question and
reported estimates of this effect. However, Browning (1992) in his survey of this topic expresses
criticism about the state of the literature saying that “although we have a number of robust
correlations there are few credible inferences that can be drawn from them”.
Trying to overcome this criticism, two strategies have been proposed that exploit exogenous
changes in family size. The first (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Bronars and Grogger, 1994; and
Jacobsen, Pearce and Rosenbloom, 1999) used the fact that twins in the first birth represent an
exogenous change in family size in order to estimate the effect of having a second child. The
second (Angrist and Evans, 1998) exploited parental preferences for mixed-sex siblings in order to
estimate the effect of a third or higher order child.
Still, the question of what is the effect of a first child on female labor supply has not been
addressed with a strategy that deals with the endogeneity of fertility. Ideally, this question could
be answered by running a social experiment where childless women are randomly assigned children
(the treatment group) or not (the control group). In this paper, I use field data that mimics this
hypothetic experiment by focusing on a sample of women that sought help to become pregnant.
After certain period since they started receiving help, some of these women are successful and have
a child while others do not.
In this instance, I find that fertility appears to be exogenous to labor supply as pre-treatment
labor supply is uncorrelated with subsequent fertility. Using the exogenous assignment of children
to women via infertility treatments as an identifying strategy, I estimate that having a first child
younger than one year-old reduces female labor force participation by 26.3 percentage points.
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These estimates are close to OLS estimates obtained using similarly defined samples from the 1980
and 1990 Censuses. The results also indicate that the estimated short-term impact of fertility on
female labor supply decreased 40 percent during the 1980 to 1990 period.
The second part of the dissertation analyzes the problem of an educational authority that
decides how to optimally reveal information about students productivity in order to induce stu-
dents to improve their educational attainments. In essence, schools and universities have valuable
information about students performance and have to decide how to optimally reveal this informa-
tion.
This work belongs to a new literature that analyzes the educational process taking into
account how students react to the way that information about their productivity is revealed to
the marketplace. Costrell (1994) and Betts (1998) analyzed the optimal way to set a standard in
a setting where the educational authority classifies students in two groups. Costrell (1994) also
analyzed whether it is optimal to classify students in only two groups or rather to disclose all
information about students’ educational levels.
This paper contributes to this new literature analyzing the more real and interesting case
in which the educational authority can choose into how many groups he wants to classify students
(potentially infinite) and the standards for each group. A theoretical model is presented in which
the educational authority enjoys a great deal of flexibility about how to optimally reveal information
about students’ attainments.
Using this model I find that the optimal revelation policy is dependent on how students
are distributed with respect to ability or other personal characteristic that influence their optimal
effort decisions. In particular, the optimal scheme could be: a) classify individuals in two groups
and just reveal this information, b) reveal all information, c) set a critical standard and group




The effect of a first child on female labor supply: evidence from women in fertility
treatments
2.1 Introduction
Estimating the effect of fertility on female labor supply has been a long standing question
in economics. Knowing how families optimize their labor supply decisions to the arrival of a
child is important for several reasons. First, it is interesting to know how much of the increase
in female labor supply during the postwar period can be explained by delayed childbearing and
reduced fertility (Goldin, 1990). Second, some researchers believe that the interruption of work
due to childbearing is responsible for a significant fraction of the female-male wage gap (Goldin
and Polachek, 1987; Fuchs, 1989; Gronau, 1988; Korenman and Neumark, 1992) and the size of
the impact of childbearing on female labor supply is an important variable in this calculation.
Third, if declines in labor supply after childbearing correspond to increases in child care time,
then knowing the effect of childbearing on female labor supply will provide information about time
inputs invested in the child (Stafford, 1987; Blau and Grossberg, 1992). Finally and above all,
economists have been interested in this question from a basic desire on knowing the quantitative
importance of different determinants of female labor supply.
Given the importance of this topic, it is not surprising that hundred of published studies have
examined the relationship between fertility and female labor supply. However, as Browning (1992)
notes in his literature review on this topic, “Although we have a number of robust correlations,
there are very few credible inferences that can be drawn from them.” The key problem faced
by researchers is that there are theoretical reasons to believe that the fertility decision may be
endogenous and therefore the strong negative correlations found between different measures of
fertility and female labor supply cannot be interpreted as evidence of causal effects.
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In trying to overcome the type of criticism highlighted by Browning (1992), two strategies
have been proposed that exploit exogenous changes in family size in order to estimate the effect
of fertility on female labor supply. The first (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Bronars and Grogger,
1994; Jacobsen, Pearce and Rosenbloom, 1999), used the fact that twins in the first birth represent
an exogenous change in family size in order to estimate the effect of having a second child. The
second (Angrist and Evans, 1998), exploited parental preferences for mixed-sex siblings in order
to estimate the effect of a third or higher order child.
Still, the question of what is the effect of a first child on female labor supply has not been
addressed with a strategy that convincingly tackles the problem of the endogeneity of fertility. It
could be argued that the effect of having a first child is the most important one, given that it
applies to nearly all women, whereas identifying the effect of having a second or higher order child
only applies to a smaller subset of women.1
Ideally, this question could be answered by running a hypothetical social experiment where
childless women are randomly assigned children or not. After the assignment of children, partic-
ipation rates across the treated and control groups could be compared in order to estimate the
causal effect of having a first child on female labor supply.
This paper focuses on a situation that mimics this hypothetic experiment. In particular, I
construct a sample of childless women that sought help to get pregnant via fertility treatments.
At the time of seeking help to get pregnant, all of them wanted to have a child but after a certain
period some of these women were successful and give birth to a child while others did not. Then,
I compare the labor participation of women that were “treated” (i.e., gave birth to a child) with
those who were not.2
The contribution of this paper is that while the twins and the preference for mixed siblings
strategies, under certain conditions, can be used to identify the effect of a second or higher order
child, the estimation strategy pursued here is able to identify the effect of a first child on female
1In the 1990 Census, among women aged 45 to 55, 89.0 percent of them had at least one child, whereas 78.3
percent had at least two and 50.4 percent had at least three children.
2Along the paper “treatment” refers to having a child.
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labor supply.
The proposed strategy tackles the potential problem of fertility being an endogenous variable
as all women wanted to have a child at the time when they sought help for the first time. However,
early success in fertility treatments is not expected to be completely random. Still, I provide
several pieces of evidence that suggest that this strategy is consistently estimating the parameter
of interest. First, following Heckman and Hotz (1989), I find that pre-treatment labor supply is
uncorrelated with subsequent fertility. Second, estimates are very robust to the set of covariates
added to the main regression. Third, observable characteristics of the sample of women that sought
help to get pregnant while childless are quite similar to women that have their first child while
aged 19 to 38 years old.
Using the exogenous assignment of children to women via infertility treatments as an iden-
tifying strategy, I estimate that having a first child younger than one year old reduces female labor
supply by 26.3 percentage points. These estimates are close to OLS and fixed-effects estimates
obtained from a panel data constructed from the NSFG. They are also close to OLS estimates ob-
tained using similarly defined samples from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. This finding is important
because almost all studies that take into account the endogeneity of the fertility decision provide
much smaller estimated impacts than those studies that assume exogenous fertility. Finally, I
provide evidence of an important reduction in the estimated short-term impact of childbearing on
female labor supply of around 40 to 50 percent during the 1980 to 1990 period.
2.2 Previous research
This paper is related to several strands of economic literature. First, it belongs to a vast
literature focusing on the effect of fertility on female labor supply. Second, its results shed light on
a number of studies that have tried to explain the postwar rise in female labor supply. Third, it
is related to a line of research that tries to establish the effect of childbearing related withdrawals
from the labor market on females’ wages and earnings. Lastly, it is also linked with a strand of
the literature focusing on how maternal work affects children outcomes.
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The attractiveness of the question of the effect of fertility on female labor supply is exposed in
the long list of studies that have focused this issue. These studies can be classified into four groups
depending on how they have tackled the problems of the endogeneity of the fertility decision. The
first group is illustrated by the studies of Gronau (1973), Heckman (1974) and Heckman and Willis
(1977), all who assumed that fertility was exogenous and established a strong negative correlation
between female labor supply and fertility.
A second group of studies acknowledged the endogeneity of the fertility decision and tried
to deal with this problem by estimating simultaneous equation models (Cain and Dooley, 1976;
Schultz, 1977; Fleisher and Rhodes, 1979). The disadvantage of this approach is that it is difficult
to find plausible exclusion restrictions that could identify the underlying structural parameters.
A third group of studies incorporated actual fertility as a regressor but added the lagged
dependent variable in an effort of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across women. Naka-
mura and Nakamura (1992) recommended this approach and it has been used by a number of
authors (Lehrer, 1992; Even, 1987). Although adding the lagged dependent variable can be useful
to control for unobserved heterogeneity, still it does not tackle the problem of the endogeneity of
the fertility decision.
Finally, a fourth group of studies tackled the endogeneity of the fertility variable by ex-
ploiting exogenous sources of variation in family size. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) first used
this strategy comparing labor supply of mothers having twins on their first birth with those that
had a single child. Subsequent studies by Bronars and Grogger (1994) and Jacobsen, Pearce and
Rosenbloom (1998) employed the same strategy but managed to get more precise estimates by
developing an algorithm to detect twin births using Census data.
In the same spirit as the twins studies mentioned above, Angrist and Evans (1998) exploited
the fact that parents prefer mixed-sex siblings in order to estimate the effect of a third or higher
order child on female labor supply. For a sample of couples with at least two children they
instrumented further childbearing (i.e., having more than two children) with a dummy for whether
the sex of the second child matches the sex of the first. As sex mix is virtually random, this
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strategy identifies the effect of a third or higher order child.
My work is most similar to this last mentioned group of studies as I use the fact that the
biology of reproduction is intrinsically stochastic in order to identify exogenous changes in fertility.
Still, there are two main differences between these studies and my paper. First, I estimate the
effect of a first child on female labor supply whereas these other studies estimates the effect of a
second or higher order child. Second, while the mentioned group of studies have used instruments
for fertility and then computed 2 SLS estimates, I tackle the endogeneity of fertility by focusing
on a sample of women for which fertility is plausibly exogenous and then estimate the impact by
just using OLS.
As noted above, my work can shed light in other strands of the literature which I will briefly
summarize next. To start with, there are a number of studies that have focused on the remarkable
increase in female labor supply during the postwar. Mincer (1962) argued that 90 percent of the
increase in female employment in the postwar years can be attributed to an increase in demand.
On the other side, Goldin (1990) argues that about half of the change in female labor supply can
be explained by shifts in supply. Given that fertility declined strongly after the baby boom, my
work can shed some light in how much of the increase in female labor supply could be explained
by reduced childbearing in this period.
A second related strand of the literature examines the deleterious effect of childbearing
on mothers’ wages. Papers by Hill (1979), and Goldin and Polachek (1987) presented evidence
that the majority of the negative association between children and wages disappear once detailed
measures of past employment are included suggesting that there is an indirect reducing effect of
children on wages through a decrease in human capital accumulation via on-the-job investment.
However, Korenman and Neumark (1992) presented suggestive evidence that in addition to the
indirect effect, there may be a direct negative effect of children on wages. Victor Fuchs (1989) goes
a step further arguing that “the greatest barrier to economic equality (between men and women)
is children.”
More recently, Miller (2005) used biological fertility shocks in order to estimate the impact
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of delay of childbearing on wages, hours worked and earnings. One of the instruments that she
used for women’s age at first birth is the lag between reporting having sex without contraception
and their first birth. In a sense, we exploit the same type of fertility shock (women that want
to have a baby cannot decide to conceive it right away). Still, our studies differ in a number of
dimensions. Most importantly, while I aim to estimate the impact of childbearing on female labor
supply, Miller was primarily concerned about how changes in the age at first birth impact long-run
earnings and future wages.3
Finally, a third related line of research focus on the effect of maternal work on children
outcomes. Some evidence has been presented suggesting that employment when children are
young may harm their cognitive abilities (Blau and Grossberg, 1992; Stafford, 1987; Desai et al.,
1989). Again, in order to gauge the relative importance of this effect, we need to know how fertility
impacts female labor supply.
2.3 Background: the reproductive process and infertility
Reproduction is a very delicate process that requires the correct functioning of the male and
female reproduction systems as well as ideally timed sexual intercourse. Conception takes place
when a motile sperm from the man burrows into an egg (ovum) from the woman and fertilizes
it. Fertilization occurs in one of the Fallopian tubes and the fertilized egg starts dividing itself as
it travels through the Fallopian tube towards the uterus. There, it will settle in the lining of the
uterus and hopefully it will grow until the baby is born.
Healthy couples having intercourse regularly have only a 20 percent chance of conceiving
during a month. This implies that around 26 percent of healthy couples will not have conceived
after 6 months of unprotected sex, and this number falls to around 7 percent after 12 months.
3Our studies also differ in the following ways. First, my empirical strategy consists in selecting a sample of
women for which fertility is presumably exogenous while Miller used the delay shock as an instrument for fertility.
Second, I use the NSFG Cycle 5 as my main dataset where Miller used the NLSY 1979. Finally, we differ in the way
that women trying to conceive are identified (I identify women seeking help to get pregnant while Miller identified
women that report having sex without contraception).
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Given these facts, couples are recommended to start receiving infertility testing and treatment
only after 6 to 12 months of trying to conceive without success. Moreover, the medical community
defines a couple as infertile if they have not conceived after 12 months of unprotected sex.4 The
National Center for Health Statistics estimated that in the United States in 1995 there were 2.1
million of infertile married couples in reproductive age and 6.1 million of women aged 15-44 had
an impaired ability to have children.5
The causes for infertility are typically grouped into four categories: a) tubal blockage or
endometriosis, b) ovulation problems, c) male (sperm) problems and d) unexplained infertility.
Tubal blockage is diagnosed in the presence of certain adhesions or scars that prevent the sperm or
the egg to move through the Fallopian tubes. It can also be the case that the tubes are swollen or
full of fluid and this prevents communication through the tubes. Depending on the severity of the
case, the problem can be fixed using a laparoscope or tubal surgery. In any case, if a pregnancy has
not taken place after 12 months following tubal surgery, in vitro fertilization should be considered.
Endometriosis is a condition where the lining of the uterus extends outside the uterus into
the ovaries, the back of the uterus and the ligaments that support the uterus. When treating this
disease, the goal is to remove the endometriosis by cutting or burning it away and leaving as much
normal ovary tissue as possible. Moderate endometriosis can be treated using a laparoscope but
more severe cases require surgery.
In almost half of the infertility cases, there is a male contribution to the problem. Samples of
sperm are analyzed in order to check whether the volume, motility, morphology and concentration
are normal. For around 90 percent of male problems, there are no effective treatments.
Finally, in approximately 15-20 percent of the cases, no obvious problem is found and
a diagnosis of unexplained infertility is made. About 60 percent of couples with unexplained
infertility will conceive in the next 3 years without any treatment at all.
Medical researchers have identified a number of factors (besides the conditions mentioned




above) that affects the prognosis of a couple. Female’s age, education, smoking status, consumption
of recreational drugs and obesity as well as sexual frequency are important predictors of the
probability of conception.6
Given the stochastic nature of the reproduction process, physicians usually start treatment
with simple and cheap procedures (like advice and testing) and only start employing more invasive
and expensive procedures as the simple treatments prove unsuccessful. As an example of this
optimal sequential strategy, physicians typically only recommend in vitro fertilization methods
after all other choices have been tried or if they strongly believed that those techniques will be
unsuccessful.
2.4 Data
This paper uses data from the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), a survey con-
ducted by the National Center for Health Statistics in 6 cycles (1973, 1976, 1982, 1988, 1995 and
2002). Cycles 1 to 5 were conducted at the homes of a national sample of women 15-44 years old,
in the civilian non-institutionalized population of the U.S. Cycle 6 also sampled men 15-44 years
old. The main purpose of these surveys was to provide reliable national data on marriage, divorce,
contraception, infertility and the health of women and infants in the U.S.
The NSFG Cycle 5 was chosen because it provides information about births, pregnancies,
infertility services, demographic characteristics and in particular the complete work history for each
individual.7 For the empirical strategy pursued in this paper, I need information about the month
in which each woman sought help to get pregnant. Fortunately, this information is provided by this
survey. Other important variables included are age, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, school
enrollment and smoking history. The survey also reports data on each full-time and part-time
employment spell.
6Sources: Dunson et all (2004) and Baird and Wilcox (1985).
7Other cycles included all needed information except from monthly employment status for each woman. I cannot
run this analysis without this information as I compare employment 21 months after each women sought help to
become pregnant.
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The NSFG Cycle 5 employs a multi-stage sampling design with an over-sample of Hispanic
and black women. It took place between January and October, 1995 and the overall response rate
was 79 percent. A total of 10,847 women were interviewed.
Data on fertility and employment is collected retrospectively. Though it is recognized the
limitations of this type of design, Teachman, Tedrow and Crowder (1998) found the NSFG Cycle
5 to be of high quality. They concluded that the employment information matches CPS data
reasonably well, although the data on employment spells has not been validated using external
records.
2.5 Empirical strategy, parameter of interest and sample construction
2.5.1 Empirical strategy
An ideal social experiment aimed to estimate the causal effect of childbearing on female
labor supply would recruit women that wanted to have a child and then assign a child to a group
of women (treated individuals) while not assigning a child to a second group (controls).8 In the real
world we cannot run this type of experiment. However, given the stochastic nature of conception,
we can attempt to mimic it. To start with, we need a group of women that wants to conceive a
baby. Second, some of these women should receive babies in a way that is uncorrelated to baseline
employment. Third, we need to observe female labor supply for both groups of women after the
assignment of babies.
I aim to mimic this ideal social experiment and fulfill the three mentioned conditions by
focusing on the following situation. I construct a sample of women that sought help to have a
child while childless (called the HELP sample). As women in this sample are starting fertility
treatments at different points in time, I normalize time by the month that they sought help for
the very first time, denoted as month 0. Next, I classify these women depending on whether they
had already given birth to a child in month 21 and in this way I get two groups of women: treated
8To be precise, this experiment will estimate the effect of having a child on female labor supply for women that
wanted to have a child, not for all women.
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and controls. Finally, I compare employment rates of these two groups of women in month 21 and
in this way I estimate the causal effect of having a first child younger than a year on female labor
supply.
I choose to compare employment in month 21 instead of other months for several reasons.
First, at this point in time almost all babies born are younger than a year old (97 percent of them)
making more precise the definition of the treatment effect. Second, using a longer horizon will allow
some women to have additional children complicating the analysis.9 Third, as time in treatment
increases, women who are unsuccessful conceiving may start adopting. Finally, looking at this
shorter time span, it is more plausible that women receive similar types of infertility treatments
(e.g., in vitro fertilization treatments are typically not considered an option in the first 12 months
after seeking help to get pregnant).
Following this strategy, I tackle the endogeneity problem given that all the women in the
HELP sample wanted to have children. Still, in order to obtain consistent estimates of the effect
of childbearing on female labor supply it is needed that the assignment process of children is
uncorrelated to baseline female labor supply. Clearly, this assumption is untestable. However,
following Heckman and Hotz (1989), I provide evidence of the plausibility of this assumption in
section 2.7, where I test whether pre-treatment labor supply is correlated with subsequent fertility.
A potential problem of this empirical strategy arises if women in the control group adopt
a child or start cohabitating or marry an individual with children. In the treatment evaluation
literature this is denoted as “substitution bias” and represents a situation where individuals in
the control group receive close substitutes for the treatment in question (see Heckman and Smith
(1995), pages 22-24). In the context of this paper, treatment is having a natural birth and a close
substitute is adopting a child (or start having a step child). Even though substitution bias can be
9Focusing on month 21 there are only 6 women that had 2 babies by this time and only one of them had twice
one baby (the other 5 women gave birth to twins).
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a real problem in certain social experiments, it is not in this case.10 Only 2.7 percent of women
in the control group adopt or start having a step child in the 21 months after they seek help to
become pregnant (and only 0.5 percent in the treatment group).
2.5.2 Parameter of interest
In this study, the parameter of interest is the average impact of having a first child younger
than 12 months on female labor supply for women that want to have a child. It is important to
note that it does not give an estimate of the effect of having a first child for women whose child
is unwanted. All the same, the parameter of interest that I am estimating applies to a fairly large
population. Henshaw (1998) using data from the NSFG Cycle 5 found that 69.8 percent of births
were intended for women aged 15-44 years old in 1994.
Throughout this study, I focus only on the short-term effects of having a first child (i.e.,
the estimated effect of having a child younger than one year old). It is clear that there are other
treatment effects that are worthy of attention. However, for reasons already discussed, the strategy
employed in this study is best suited to estimate this treatment effect.
Finally, an estimate of the impact of the first child younger than a year old is important for
a number of reasons. First, as mentioned above, this effect will apply to a much wider population
than estimates that focus the effect of a second or higher order child. Second, there is consensus
that the short-term effects of childbearing are substantially bigger than the longer-term effects
(Browning, 1992). Then, knowing the short-term effects is useful as it gives an upper bound for
these longer-term effects. Third, Shapiro and Mott (1991) provide strong evidence that labor force
status following the first birth is an important predictor of lifetime work experience. This implies
that changes in the estimated short-term impact of having a first child on female labor supply
could be predicting a substantial change in overall lifetime work experience for women. Finally,
using this empirical strategy I can compare the estimated impacts obtained when tackling the
10In the case of the experimental evaluation of the training program JTPA, Heckman and Smith (1995) noted
that 32 percent of control group members self-reported receiving training from other sources over the 18 months
following random assignment.
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endogeneity problem (i.e., using the HELP sample) with estimates from strategies that do not
tackle this problem (e.g., OLS on Census data).
2.5.3 Sample construction
The main sample used in this paper (the HELP sample) includes childless women who
sought help to become pregnant while aged 19 to 38 years old.11 Women that sought help less
than 21 months before the interview are dropped from the HELP sample, because it is not possible
to observe their child and labor status at this key time. Finally, I drop one observation for which
there is a missing value for one of the variables used in the analysis.
Table 2.1 presents the algorithm employed in order to construct the HELP sample. This
table shows that only 499 observations are included in the empirical analysis, a fact that may seem
as an important limitation for this study. However, as shown in section 2.6, I precisely estimate
the relevant coefficient of the effect of having a first child on female labor supply.
The basic empirical strategy of this paper consists on comparing women in the HELP sample
that already had a baby by month 21 with those who did not. To identify these two groups of
women, an indicator called AnyChildren21 is defined that equals to 1 if the woman had a baby
by month 21. In this setting, women from the HELP sample for whom AnyChildren21 equals
to 1 correspond to women that were “treated” and those for whom AnyChildren21 equals to 0
correspond to the “control” or comparison group.12
Descriptive statistics for women in the treatment and control groups are presented in Ta-
ble 2.2. In the NSFG Cycle 5, respondents were asked about all their employment spells information
which I use in order to construct three employment variables. The variables Employed21 and Em-
ployed0 are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the individual was employed in months 21 and 0
11I drop women younger than 19 years old at the time when they first sought help to become pregnant because
work information is only reported since the women turned 18 and I want to know employment status one year before
seeking help to become pregnant.
12For easy of exposition, along the paper I will denote as treated women to those that had a baby by month 21
whereas women that did not have a baby by month 21 are referred as “controls” (even though in the evaluation
literature the word “controls” is used for subjects not receiving treatment in an experiment).
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respectively. Similarly, Employed 12 represents labor status in month -12 (i.e., 12 months before
the woman sought help for the first time).
It is important to note that while employment rates in month 0 and -12 are similar between
treated and control women, employment rates differ by 25.3 percentage points in month 21. More-
over, observable characteristics in month 0 between treated and control women are quite similar.
The only exception is that the control group has a much lower fraction of Hispanic women than
the treatment group, but it is important to point out that there are only 34 Hispanic women in the
HELP sample. Finally, the treated group tends to include individuals that are slightly younger,
more educated and a lower fraction of them were smoking when sought help to get pregnant for
the first time.13
A potential caveat for the strategy pursued in this paper is that, as typically is the case in
social and medical experiments, the population involved in the experiment may not be represen-
tative of the whole population. In order to gauge the potential severity of this problem Table 2.3
compares descriptive statistics of women in the HELP sample with those of women in the NSFG
that had at least a child. For women in the HELP sample, time-varying variables are measured
at the time they first sought help to get pregnant where for women that had at least a child these
variables are measured at the time of first birth. In the last column of Table 2.3 statistics are
presented for the set of women in the NSFG that had their first child while being 19 to 38 years
old (as these age requirements were used to construct the HELP sample). Table 2.3 shows that
women in the HELP sample tend to be older, more educated, have higher employment rates and
have higher smoking rates, while a lower proportion of them are Hispanic or black, as compared
to women from the NSFG that were aged 19 to 38 when they had their first child. Still, basic
statistics for the HELP sample are not very different from those women in the NSFG that had a
first child while being 19 to 38 years old.
Figure 2.1 compares the age distribution of women in the NSFG that gave birth when aged
19 to 38 years old to the age distribution of women in the HELP sample. This figure shows that
13In section 2.7 I explore more deeply which variables predict fertility by month 21.
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the difference in mean age across these two groups is driven primarily by the group of women aged
19 to 21. This difference can be explained by the fact that some women in the NSFG group are
having unplanned children and also by the fact that really young women would tend to delay their
decision to seek help to get pregnant.14
2.6 Results
This section presents the main results of the empirical analysis. In essence, I will compare
participation rates in month 21 for treated and control women in the HELP sample. The econo-
metric model is represented by this simple OLS equation (remember that AnyChildren21 equals
to 1 for treated women):
Employed21i = α + β AnyChildren21i + γ Xi + ui
The vector of covariates include black and Hispanic dummies, an indicator for insurance
coverage of infertility treatments, year in which they sought help for the first time and the following
variables measured in month 0: age, smoking status and years of education.
In order to gauge the potential importance of the problem of not having information of
certain variables that may be simultaneously correlated with the probability of conception and
labor supply, I run a number of regressions including separate sets of covariates. If the results
were sensitive to the set of covariates added to the regression, this would raise some doubts about
whether the identification strategy is consistently estimating the parameter of interest. Table 2.4
presents these regressions results.
In the model that includes all covariates, I estimate that having a first child younger than
a year old decreases female labor participation by 26.3 percentage points (the associated t-ratio is
-6.12). The results indicate that the estimated impact is remarkably robust to the set of covariates
included in the regression. In particular, the estimated effect in a model with no covariates is
-0.253. That is, including the whole set of covariates, the estimated coefficient changes by just 1
14Moreover, this age difference drives many of the differences in other variables. Basic statistics for women in the
HELP sample that sought help while being 22 to 38 years old are very similar to these statistics for women in the
NSFG that had their first child in this age range.
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percentage point or 4 percent of the estimated impact.
Women that have a child not only decide whether to have a job or not (the extensive
margin) but also how many hours to work (the intensive margin). Unfortunately the NSFG
does not provide retrospective information on hours worked for women in the sample. Still, it
provides information about whether the individual was working full-time or part-time and also the
availability of maternity leave. Then, defining work status in four categories (full-time, part-time,
maternity leave and no job), Table 2.5 provides data on how work status across these four groups
is affected by the fertility status of each woman.15
This table shows that although the fraction of women not holding a job is 25.3 percentage
points higher for women that had a child in month 21, there is a larger impact on the fraction of
women that work full-time (it is 41.7 percentage points lower for women having a baby). Also as
expected, the fraction of women on maternity leave is 12.5 percentage points higher for women
than had a child in month 21 while the fraction of women working part-time is 3.8 percentage
points higher.16
Table 2.6 presents multinomial logit regression results of having a first child on work status.
The dependent variable has the same four categories mentioned above (full-time, part-time, ma-
ternity leave and no job). Marginal effects of increasing AnyChildren21 from 0 to 1 are presented.
Results are similar to those obtained by the comparison of controls and treated groups in Table 2.5
though the estimated impact of having child on not having a job and working full time are (in
absolute value) larger, while the estimated impact on maternity leave is slightly smaller.
15Throughout the paper, “work status” refers to the classification of women with respect to these four status
(full-time, part-time, maternity leave and no job) whereas “employment” denotes to the classification of women
with respect to whether they hold a job or not.
16The 0.4 percent of women in the control group that were on maternity leave corresponds to women that by
month 21 still did not have a child but were pregnant.
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2.7 Robustness of the empirical strategy
This section explores the robustness of the empirical strategy pursued. First, I try to identify
which covariates can predict treatment and how much of the variation in the fertility variable is
explained by these variables. Second, following Heckman and Hotz (1989), I test whether there are
pre-treatment differences in the outcome variable (labor market participation) between the treated
and control groups. Finally, I check how robust the results are to changes in the specification of
the econometric model such as adding a dummy variable for whether the woman was pregnant or
not in month 21.
To start with, I explore which variables in the dataset predict early fertility success in the
HELP sample. If I was really running a social experiment, this step would have been seen as a way
of testing whether the randomization mechanism involved in the experiment attained the goal of
balancing the different covariates in the treatment and control groups. In the case of the empirical
strategy followed, given that the medical literature documents a number of variables that predict
success rates of fertility attempts (for example, female’s age), I just try to identify which these
variables are and how much variation in the fertility variable they can explain. In order to do so,
I regress AnyChildren21 on the set of covariates used in the analysis of the previous section.
Table 2.7 shows that, as documented in the medical literature, female’s age is one of the
most important predictors of fertility. In this linear probability model, an increase in one year in
the age of a woman decreases her expected probability of having a child by 1.6 percentage points
(the associated t-ratio is -2.67). Smoking, also documented in the medical literature as having an
effect on fertility, is a significant predictor of fertility success. Finally, Hispanics and more educated
women are also more likely to be successful.
Even though there are several variables that can predict treatment, it should be noted that
the adjusted r-squared is only 4.3 percent and then there is much of the variation in the fertility
variable that remains unexplained in this model.
Next, I tackle the issue of whether the significant differences in labor market participation
between treated and control woman in month 21 can be interpreted as the effect of treatment or
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rather just heterogeneity in labor market attachment between groups. This is an important test for
the empirical strategy pursued in the paper. Before presenting the regression results it is useful to
look at Figure 2.2 which shows employment rates of the treatment and control groups for months
-12 to 21 (again, month 0 corresponds to the month in which each woman first sought help to get
pregnant). Employment rates of both groups are quite similar for months -12 to 0 but they start
diverging around month 3 and are far apart by month 21. The continuous decline in employment
rates for the treated group corresponds to the fact that, as time goes by, different women are giving
birth (but all of them had already given birth by month 21).
I check more systematically this difference by regressing employment status in month 0
(Employed0 ) on AnyChildren21. Several regressions are ran in which I control for different set of
covariates in order to gauge the robustness of the results. These results are presented in Table 2.8.
The main result is that there are no statistically significant differences between the treated
and control groups in labor market participation in month 0. This result is robust across a number
of specifications in which different sets of covariates are added, giving additional evidence that
there were no significant differences in employment across the treated and control groups when
women sought help to become pregnant.
Similar regressions as those presented in Table 2.8 are ran using as dependent variable
Employed 12 (employment dummy for month -12) instead of Employed0. Results are presented in
Table 2.9. In these additional regressions I check whether there are differences in labor participation
rates across the treated and control groups 12 months before women sought help to get pregnant.
The results also give evidence in favor of the empirical strategy pursued. In all regressions the
estimated coefficient for AnyChildren21 is smaller (in absolute value) than 0.023 and the associated
t-ratio are (in absolute value) between 0.38 and 0.59 depending on the specification.
Finally, I run a number of regressions in order to check whether the results are robust to
changes in the specification. First, I re-run the regressions whose results were presented in Table 2.4
but adding a dummy for whether the woman was pregnant in month 21 (this variable is denoted
Pregnant21 ). These results are presented in Table 2.10. The estimated impact is very similar to
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the results reported in Table 2.4. Next, the main independent variable AnyChildren21 is replaced
with another variable Own21 that equals to the number of children in month 21. Third, I replace
AnyChildren21 with two dummy variables: OneChild21 and TwoChildren21 (that equals to 1 if
the woman had one child and two children in month 21, respectively). Fourth, instead of running
linear probability models of Employed21 on AnyChildren21, I run probit and logit models using
the same set of variables as in Table 2.4. In all these cases the estimated impacts are very similar
to those reported in section 2.6.17
2.8 Comparison to estimates from NSFG and Census data
In his survey of the effect of children in the household, Browning (1992) concluded that
studies that take fertility as exogenous typically found significant larger impact of fertility on
female labor supply than those that treat it as endogenous and estimate simultaneous equation
models. Angrist and Evans (1998) provided further evidence about this argument as they reported
that their 2SLS of the impact of having more than two children on female labor supply were
statistically smaller than their OLS estimates. This section compares estimates obtained using the
HELP sample with those from similarly defined samples but without restricting to women that
sought help to get pregnant.
A problem faced in trying to replicate the HELP sample is that this dataset includes ob-
servations of fertility and labor supply for women that sought help to get pregnant at different
points in time. This implies that in order to replicate the results from the HELP sample I should
construct comparable data sets with observations for individuals at different points in time: i.e., a
panel data or repeated cross-sections. Having this in mind, I compare estimates from the HELP
sample to estimates from a panel data from the NSFG (in subsection 2.8.1) and to estimates from
Census data for 1980 and 1990 (in subsection 2.8.2).
17Results are available from the author upon request.
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2.8.1 Comparison to estimates from NSFG panel data
I construct a panel data from the NSFG Cycle 5 (called the NSFG panel data) following
similar requirements to those used to construct the HELP sample. The unit of observation in this
panel data is a woman-month. An observation is included in the NSFG panel data if the woman
was aged 21 to 40 years old at that month, was childless or had children younger than a year old
and was cohabitating or married.
As the HELP sample corresponds to a cross-section, in order to use the same source of
variation when estimating both models, I construct a panel data set (called the HELP panel data)
including for each individual in the HELP sample, observations for months -12 to 21 (remember
that month 0 corresponds to when the individual first sought help to get pregnant). Again, the
unit of observation is a woman-month.
Table 2.11 presents summary statistics for the HELP panel data and the NSFG panel data.
Mean values for key variables are similar except for the fact that the fraction of observations in
which the woman had a child is much higher in the NSFG panel data than in the HELP panel
data. This difference is due to the fact that all individuals in the HELP panel data did not have
children for months -12 up to (at least) month 7.
In Table 2.12, summary statistics for the HELP panel data and the NSFG panel data are
presented, now by fertility status of the individual in the particular month. Note that participation
rates for individuals in both samples are very similar once we condition by fertility status. This
suggests that estimates of the impact of childbearing on employment are very similar across the
two datasets.
Linear probability estimates of the impact of having at least a child (younger than a year
old) on the probability of having a job are presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.13. In the
first column, results are presented for the model estimated using the HELP panel data. The main
independent variable is AnyChildren (equal to 1 if the woman in that month had a child and 0 if
not). The estimated impact (0.251) is very close to the estimates obtained in section 2.6. In the
third column, results are presented for the same model estimated on the NSFG panel data. The
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key result when comparing columns 1 and 3 is that the estimated impact using the NSFG panel
data (0.259) is notably similar to the one obtained using the HELP panel data.18
In order to gauge the robustness of these results, I estimate fixed-effects models on both
panel data sets. Results are presented in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.13. For the HELP panel
data the estimated impact slightly decreases in absolute value to 0.225. In the case of the NSFG
panel data, the estimated impact decreases in absolute value to 0.219. This result provides some
evidence that women that have children tend to have lower employment rates in months previous
to get pregnant. Still, both estimates are very similar and the t-value of the test of equality of
coefficients is just -0.02.
In the reminder of this subsection, I compare the estimated impact of having a child on
work status (working full-time, part-time, maternity leave and no job) between these two panel
data sets. Table 2.14 reports the distribution of women with respect to work status by fertility
status for individuals in the HELP panel data and the NSFG panel data. While the fraction of
women in the “no job” and “part-time” categories are very similar across data sets (conditional
on fertility), the fraction of women that have a child and are on maternity leave is much larger for
the HELP panel data than for the NSFG panel data (and the fraction working full-time is much
lower).
In order to corroborate these results, I run a multinomial logit regression on each data set
in order to estimate the impact of fertility on work status. Results are presented in Table 2.15.
Again, the effect of fertility on the fraction of women in the “no job” and “part-time” categories
are very similar across data sets while the impact on the fraction of maternity leave is much larger
in the HELP panel data than in the NSFG panel data (and the impact on the fraction working
full-time is smaller in absolute value).
These results can be explained by the interaction of two factors: 1) mothers in the HELP
panel data tend to have younger babies; 2) mothers of young babies are more likely to be on
maternity leave than working full-time. Regarding the first factor, Figure 2.3 presents the distrib-
18the t-value of the test of equality of coefficients is 0.22.
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ution of observations of mothers in each data set with respect to their babies’ age in months. This
distribution would be flat if for each mother in a panel data we had all observations while her baby
was younger than a year old. While the distribution for the NSFG panel data is almost flat, its
counterpart for the HELP panel data is sharply decreasing due to the way the latter panel data
is constructed. Mothers in the HELP sample had a baby by month 21 and the HELP panel data
includes monthly observations for months -12 to 21. Then, as women in this sample are having
babies in different months (from around month 9 to month 21) all of them will be included in the
HELP panel data when their baby is 0 months old but only a few of them (the ones that give
babies very early) will have observations in the panel data in which their baby is close to one year
old.
Figure 2.4 displays the distribution of women from the HELP sample that had a baby by
month 21 with respect to work status by month (in this graph, month 0 corresponds to the month
in which the baby was born). As expected, the fraction of women on maternity leave and working
full-time is very dependant on the babies’ age. Women that have just had babies tend to stop
working full-time and rely heavily on maternity leave. This pattern, combined with the fact that
women in the HELP panel data tend to have younger babies relative to the NSFG panel data,
explains why the fraction of women on maternity leave is much larger in the HELP panel data
than in the NSFG panel data. Note also that the fraction of women without a job is quite constant
across women with babies of different age (in months) giving assurance that the similarity of the
estimates of fertility on employment between both panel data sets is not dependant on the fact
that the age in months distribution across samples is quite different.
Finally, to provide additional evidence in favor of the argument that we should get similar
estimates if we condition on babies’ age in months, I present Figures 2.5 and 2.6 which show the
distribution of mothers in these two data sets with respect to work status by babies’ age. Figure 2.5
presents the fraction of mothers working part-time and without a job by their baby’s age. These
distributions for both data sets line up very well except for the fraction of women working part-time
with older babies. This reflects that as there are few women in the HELP panel data with older
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babies, there is higher sampling variability when computing these fractions. Similar observations
can be drawn from Figure 2.6 which presents the fraction of mothers working full-time and on
maternity leave.
2.8.2 Comparison to estimates using Census 1980 and 1990 data
A first step in this exercise consists in choosing which Census years we should use as a
comparison to the HELP sample. To make this decision, I check in which year fertility and other
covariates are observed for each individual in the HELP sample. On average these variables are
observed in 1986 and the 10th and 90th percentiles correspond to years 1978 and 1993, respectively.
Taking this into account, it seems reasonable to compare the results obtained using the HELP
sample to results obtained from two samples constructed using Census data for years 1980 and
1990.
Then, I construct two samples using the 5-percent Census Public Use Micro Samples for
1980 and 1990. These samples (from now on PUMS 1980 and PUMS 1990) include married women
aged 21 to 40 years old, childless or with children younger than a year old. Only married women
are kept in the sample in order to get women that are “at risk” of having a child. To make these
samples comparable to the HELP sample, I keep only married women in the HELP sample for the
analysis performed in this subsection.19
Table 2.16 presents descriptive statistics for the HELP, PUMS 1980 and PUMS 1990 sam-
ples. In the case of the HELP sample, the variable Employed is an indicator that equals to 1 if
the woman had a job in month 21. For the PUMS samples, it equals to 1 if the woman had a job
during the previous week to the survey. The variables AnyChildren, Age, Education, Hispanic and
Black are similarly defined in the three samples and are all measured in month 21 (for the HELP
sample) or at the time of the survey (for the PUMS samples). AnyChildren equals to 1 if the
woman had at least a child. Education corresponds to the number of years of education. Finally,
Black and Hispanic are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the woman belongs to each of these
19Results obtained dropping the requirement of women in the HELP and PUMS samples to be married are very
similar to those presented in this subsection (they are available from the author upon request).
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groups.
Note in Table 2.16 that mean values of covariates in the HELP sample typically lie between
the corresponding statistics for PUMS 1980 and 1990 suggesting that the latter two samples can be
considered as sensible comparison data sets for the HELP sample. The only exception corresponds
to the fraction of women that have a child which is significantly higher in the HELP sample. This
should be expected, given that presumably all women in the HELP sample wanted to have children.
In Table 2.17 summary statistics by fertility status are presented for the three samples.
Similar patterns are observed when comparing women who are childless and those with children
in the three samples. The most important difference between the HELP sample and the PUMS
sample is that women in the HELP sample, conditional on fertility status, present higher labor
participation rate than women in the PUMS samples (this could stem from the fact that employ-
ment is not defined exactly in the same way in the NSFG compared to the Census). Finally, a
remarkable finding from this table is that while participation rates for childless women increases
slightly as we compare PUMS 1990 versus PUMS 1980, women with children have significantly
higher average participation rates in 1990 compared to 1980 (0.598 versus 0.419) suggesting that
the impact of having a child has drastically decreased over this time period.
Linear probability estimates of the impact of having a child (younger than a year old) on
employment are presented in Table 2.18. Column 1 presents results for the HELP sample. The
estimated impact is -0.277. Column 3 presents the estimated impact for the PUMS 1980 sample
(0.365) and column 4 for the PUMS 1990 sample (0.228). Given the significant reduction in
the estimated impact between 1980 and 1990, I proceed to augment the estimated model for the
HELP sample in order to allow for a varying treatment effect over time. In order to do so, I
rank observations in the HELP sample according to the month in which these women sought help
to become pregnant and I divide these women in two groups: those who sought help before the
median month at which women in the sample sought help (LateHelp = 0) and those who sought
help later (LateHelp = 1). Women in the early help group were observed on average in 1981.4,
while the corresponding statistic for woman in the late help group is 1991.0. This implies that
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the estimated impact for women in the early help group could be compared to the results using
the PUMS 1980 sample, while the estimated impact for women in the late help group could be
compared to the results using the PUMS 1990 sample.
Linear probability estimates of the impact of having a child on employment allowing for
differential effects for individuals in the early and later help group are presented in column 2 of
Table 2.18. The estimated impact for women in the early help group is -0.377. This estimate
is very close from the estimated impact using the PUMS 1980 sample (-0.365). Moreover, the
estimated impact for women in the late help group is -0.192 (-0.377+0.185) which is also close to
the estimated impact using the PUMS 1990 sample (-0.228).
From this set of results I can state two important conclusions. First, the estimated impacts
obtained for the sample for which I can identify an exogenous change in the fertility variable (the
HELP sample) are really close to the estimates obtained using OLS on comparable samples from
Census data for which I do not control for the endogeneity of the fertility variable (and they are also
very close to estimates obtained using a panel data from the NSFG as concluded in the previous
subsection). Second, there is evidence of a significant reduction of about 40 to 50 percent in the
short-term impact of childbearing on female labor supply in the 1980 to 1990 period.
2.9 Conclusions
This paper explores the question of the causal effect of childbearing on female labor supply.
Answering this question is difficult for two reasons. First, some researchers believe that women
that have children at a certain age may have different baseline labor supply from women with
similar observed characteristics that do not have children at that age (Browning, 1992). This
expected unobserved heterogeneity across groups suggests the existence of bias in simple cross-
section comparisons. As noted by Nakamura and Nakamura (1992), we can try to deal with this
problem adding to regressions of current labor supply on number of children the lagged values of
labor supply.
However, there is a second problem that has complicated the estimation of the effect of
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childbearing on female labor supply that cannot be solved by just using longitudinal data. This
problem stems from the fact that the fertility decision may be endogenous to the woman and
influenced by potential labor supply. Several studies starting with Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)
have used the fact that having twins in the first birth changes (at least temporarily) family size.
Angrist and Evans (1998) exploited the fact that parents typically prefer mixed-sex siblings in
order to find exogenous variation to the fertility decision. Even though these papers have made a
major contribution in answering the question posed, they are only able to estimate the effect of
having a second or higher-order child.
In this paper, I estimate the short-term effects of having a first child on female labor supply.
In order to deal with the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity I restrict my
attention to a group of women that sought help to get pregnant. In this sample, all the women
wanted to have children and then the problem of endogeneity is minimized. Moreover, as a major
fraction of the fertility variable is random, I can suspect that results will not be contaminated by
unobserved heterogeneity across groups. In fact, the attractiveness of the strategy pursued is that,
it mimics an ideal social experiment in which for a group of women that wanted to have a child,
some women are assigned children while others are not. I provide evidence in favor of the empirical
strategy pursued as I find that pre-treatment labor supply is uncorrelated with subsequent fertility.
Following this empirical strategy I estimate that having a first child younger than a year
old reduces female labor supply by 26.3 percentage points. Interestingly, I obtain strong evidence
that the estimates obtained using this strategy (which tackles the problem of the endogeneity of
fertility) are very close to estimates derived from approaches that assume the exogeneity of fertility.
Given that studies which assume the exogeneity of fertility typically find larger impacts of
fertility on female labor supply than those that treat as endogenous, a natural extension of this
paper would be to attempt to understand why my empirical strategy reaches a different conclusion.
One salient characteristic of this study is that all samples are defined consistently in order to make
sure that the same treatment effect is being estimated across samples, i.e., the effect of having
a child younger than a year old on employment. It could be the case that not holding constant
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the age distribution of women’s children could be an underlying reason for differences in estimates
across studies.
Another interesting question that is left unanswered in this paper is why the empirical
strategy seems to work. In other words, why do fertility and baseline employment seem to be
uncorrelated? There are many potential hypotheses that it is possible to lay out in order to
predict problems of the identification strategy. For example, using this strategy I restricted the
sample to women that are homogeneous in that all wanted to have a child at certain point in time,
but clearly they could differ in how much they wanted to have it and this could be correlated with
baseline labor force attachment.
A potential explanation for the evidence that subsequent fertility is uncorrelated with pre-
treatment labor supply could be related to the fact that women in the HELP sample typically wait
a number of months until they seek help to get pregnant. This “waiting” could be reducing the
heterogeneity of individuals in the sample with respect to their baseline probability of being treated
(where treatment refers to having a child). Individuals with very high probability of being treated,
receive treatment early and then they are not included in the sample if we restrict it to individuals
that have not been treated after certain period of time. As individuals in the sample have more
similar probabilities of being treated, we tend to the ideal situation of random assignment which
is characterized as one in which all individuals have equal probability of being treated. If evidence
is found in favor to this hypothesis that “waiting” is a successful empirical strategy in the sense
that it increases the similarity between the treated and control groups, then this same strategy
could be applied to other evaluation problems where there is dynamic assignment of individuals
to treatment.
28
Table 2.1: Algorithm employed to construct the HELP sample
29
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics - HELP sample
30
Table 2.3: Comparison of HELP sample with women in the NSFG that had at least one child
31
Table 2.4: Linear probability estimates. Impact of having a first child on employment. Dependent
variable is Employed21 - HELP sample
32
Table 2.5: Fraction of women in each work status in month 21 - HELP sample
33
Table 2.6: Multinomial logit estimates of the impact of having a first child on work status - HELP
sample
34
Table 2.7: Linear probability estimates. Predicting fertility using selected covariates. Dependent
variable is AnyChildren21 - HELP sample
35
Table 2.8: Linear probability estimates. Explaining employment in month 0 using fertility status
in month 21. Dependent variable is Employed0 - HELP sample
36
Table 2.9: Linear probability estimates. Explaining employment in month -12 using fertility status
in month 21. Dependent variable is Employed 12 - HELP sample
37
Table 2.10: Linear probability estimates. Impact of having a first child on employment. Dependent
variable is Employed21 - HELP sample
38
Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics - HELP panel data and NSFG panel data
39
Table 2.12: Descriptive statistics by fertility status - HELP panel data and NSFG panel data
40
Table 2.13: Linear probability estimates. Impact of having a first child on employment. Dependent
variable is Employed - HELP panel data and NSFG panel data
41
Table 2.14: Distribution of women with respect to work status by fertility status - HELP panel
data and NSFG panel data
42
Table 2.15: Multinomial logit estimates of the impact of having a first child on work status - HELP
panel data and NSFG panel data
43
Table 2.16: Descriptive statistics - HELP, 1980 PUMS and 1990 PUMS samples
44
Table 2.17: Descriptive statistics by fertility status - HELP, 1980 PUMS and 1990 PUMS samples
45
Table 2.18: Linear probability estimates. Impact of having a first child on employment - HELP,
1980 PUMS and 1990 PUMS samples
46
Figure 2.1: Distribution of women by age at: a) first birth (mothers with first birth when aged 19
to 38), b) which first sought help to get pregnant (women in the HELP sample)
47
Figure 2.2: Employment rates by month for women that: a) had a baby by month 21 b) did not
have a baby by month 21 - HELP sample
48
Figure 2.3: Distribution of mothes by babies’ age in months - NSFG panel data and HELP panel
data
49
Figure 2.4: Distribution of work status around birth month - women that gave birth to a child by
month 21 - HELP sample
50
Figure 2.5: Fraction of mothers working part-time and without a job by babies’ age - NSFG panel
data and HELP panel data
51
Figure 2.6: Fraction of mothers working full-time and on maternity leave by babies’ age - NSFG
panel data and HELP panel data
52
Chapter 3
On the optimal revelation policy for educational achievement
3.1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years real expenditures per student in the U.S. have doubled. In the
same period, test results reported in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
have remained almost constant. Almost simultaneously, an empirical literature has arisen that
tried to estimate an education production function where the main input was considered to be
expenditures per student and the output some measure of cognitive skills as test scores. However,
this view of the educational process has faced some challenges that can be summarized in the
following question. How is it possible that educational inputs increase dramatically and output
nearly does not increase at all?
More recently, some researchers have tried to address the previous paradox by aiming at
a neglected education input: students’ effort (Costrell, 1994; Betts, 1998). This new strand of
the literature analyzes the educational process in a principal-agent setting where educators try
to maximize educational output setting up an optimal scheme that takes into account students’
preferences and incentives.
The central message of this paper is that the way schools and universities reveal information
about students is a very useful tool to influence students decisions about effort. In particular, the
optimal revelation policy should be dependent on the way students are distributed with respect to
ability or other personal characteristics that influence their effort decisions.
To show this point, I present a simple model in which I analytically demonstrate that the
optimal revelation policy depends on the distribution of students with respect to ability. In this
model, if this density is decreasing, the educational authority should reveal all information about
students’ productivity. If this density is increasing, he should classify individuals in two groups
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and only reveal this information. Finally, if the density is single-peaked, he should set a critical
standard, group together all individuals below this level and provide full information for students
that surpass it.
This model share features of other models in this new literature. I assume that firms do not
observe individuals’ productivity but rather to which group the student was classified into by the
educational authority. Due to perfect competition in labor markets, wages for individuals in each
group are set at the expected productivity level for the group. Therefore, the educational authority
can influence students’ behavior by deciding his classification policy. In short, the educational
authority has better information than firms about students’ productivity and decides an optimal
revelation policy for this information.
Typically in previous models, the educational authority was constrained to classify indi-
viduals into two groups and then he could only decide where to set the only one standard. The
only exception is Costrell (1994) who explores whether the educational authority should classify
individuals in two groups and reveal this information or whether he should reveal all the informa-
tion. Based on simulations, he found that this decision will be affected by the degree of students’
heterogeneity and also by how egalitarian the educational authority is. Nonetheless, he asserted
that under most plausible cases, perfect information increases GDP as well as social welfare.
This paper contributes to this literature analyzing the more real and interesting situation
where the educational authority is not constrained to choose whether to classify students into two
groups or to reveal perfect information, but rather he can choose into how many groups he wants
to classify students (potentially infinite) and the standards for each group. An interesting finding
of this paper is that for the plausible case where the density of students is single-peaked, it is
shown that the optimal schedule combines the two “extremes”: the educational authority should
set a critical standard and provide no information below it (just say that the student failed to
attain the standard) and all the information above it.
Costrell (1994) also analyzed how the optimal standard, in a setting where the educational
authority can only classify students into two groups, varies under different environments. One of
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the main conclusions of his work was that an egalitarian educator will set a lower standard than
an income maximizing one. However, Betts (1998) presents a model where individuals’ ability
affects productivity even when students provide the lowest amount of effort and shows that, in this
context, an egalitarian standard setter may choose a higher standard than an income maximizing
one.
These theoretical developments were accompanied by many empirical studies that focused
on the effects of the creation of high stakes exams in different states over students wages, number of
drop-outs and educational achievements.1 This research effort was fueled by an important public
debate about the educational system in the U.S.
In particular, there has been a major and growing concern about the causes and consequences
of the poor achievement levels of American students when compared to their counterparts in other
developed countries. One of the areas of debate is about the way that schools and universities
should convey information to the marketplace and in particular whether they should provide
only information about graduation (a discrete variable) or they should provide all the available
information. John L. Bishop (1997, 2000, 2001) has been a major supporter of the full information
option and has provided a number of policy recommendations about the way to attain this goal.
The model presented in this paper contributes to this discussion as it provides some guidance
about how this revelation policy should be decided. Taking the model at face value, this implies
that policy recommendations are going to vary depending on the school environment. In particular,
we can think that in the case of high schools, which a big fraction of the population attends, the
distribution of students with respect to ability will be single-peaked. Consequently, in this case the
educational authority should set a critical standard, provide full information above that standard
and no information below it. However, in the case of graduate studies, we may suspect that this
distribution is characterized by a high number of individuals with high ability and a low number
of individuals with low ability. Following the results of this paper, in this case the educational
1Betts (2003) focused on the impact of grading standards on student achievement and entry-level earnings.
Lillard (2001), Bishop (2001) and Jacob (2001) have investigated the effects of high school graduation exams on
students earnings and the number of drop outs.
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authority should classify students just in two groups and reveal whether a student graduated or
not.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model and
discuss its features and assumptions. Section 3.3 describes the solution of the model. Finally,
section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The model
In this paper, I analyze the problem that an educational authority faces when he tries to
maximize mean education level of a heterogeneous population of students. In this problem there
are three types of agents: the educational authority, students-workers and firms. These actors
pursue different objectives and interact in a setting where information (and the lack of it) plays a
central role.
I assume that students’ preferences are defined over lifetime wages and effort provided during
the education process. Their productivity in the marketplace is a function of innate ability and
the effort provided while they were at school (their decision variable). In particular, I assume that:







where U represents the utility of the student, w his lifetime wages, e his effort level, p his
productivity and finally a his ability level.
Solving equation 3.2 for effort and replacing it in equation 3.1:




That is, students are going to have higher levels of utility the higher lifetime wages, but
lower levels of utility the more productive they are (keeping wages constant) as it is costly for them
to be more productive.
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In this model students are different from each other and educators cannot specify different
standards for different students. If all students are identical with respect to preferences and
ability, then the professor’s problem is straightforward (maximize his utility function subject to
the participation constraint of the representative student). Similarly, if the professor can set
one standard for each student, again he is going to solve a simple maximization problem but
now he solves one for each student. The interesting and real case is the one where students are
heterogeneous and the professor has to set the same policy for all students.
Throughout this paper, I model student heterogeneity by assuming that students only differ
in the ability parameter a. That is, I will assume that F (·) represents the cumulative distribution
of students with respect to ability and f (·) its density, with supports from 0 to ā. All the results
of this paper will hold if I alternatively assume that students differ in their disutility of effort or in
the relative weight that they give to current disutility of effort and future consumption provided I
keep the same distributional assumptions over these parameters.2
I assume that firms operate under perfect competition in the labor market. In a world of
perfect information and perfect competition, the relationship between a worker’s productivity and
his wage should be proportional, i.e. a worker who can produce double the amount of goods than
another worker should receive double pay. However, a key fact in labor markets is that firms do
not perfectly observe individuals’ productivity. As it is customary in this type of models, I assume
that firms observe educational attainments and pay each individual wages equal to the expected
productivity of their educational group. Then, wages are going to depend on the group that the
individual belongs to rather than his actual productivity. But how are individuals assigned to
groups, and how are these groups defined? To answer these questions I present the third actor:
2this claim can be supported by observing that the assumptions over heterogeneity in ability ultimately affect the
way that students weight lifetimes wages and productivity. That is, the students utility function can be represented
as:
U = w − βp2
and then we can see that changes in the ability parameter a just affect the parameter β. That is, students
ultimately differ in their parameter β. But this heterogeneity clearly could have arisen if they value differently
current effort versus future consumption or if they differ in their disutility of effort.
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the educational authority.
The educational authority is concerned about the educational level (or productivity) that
students attain after the educational process. In particular, I assume that the educational authority




where z(a) represents the school preferred productivity level for a student of ability a. That
is, if the school were able to force a student of ability a to attain certain productivity level, the
school would make the student to attain a productivity level equal to z(a). As p(a) represents the
productivity level chosen by student of type a, then |z(a) − p(a)| represents how different is the
actual productivity level of the student of ability a compared with what the school would like him




Later I will show that a student of type a attains his first best when he chooses a productivity
level equal to a. Then, the assumption just presented is used to model the fact that there exists a
conflict of interest between students and educators with respect to what the optimal educational
level is for these students (educators would like to make students attain higher levels of education
than what students would like).3
In order to maximize his objective function the educational authority (from now on the pro-
fessor) chooses a revelation policy. This revelation policy consists in partitioning the productivity
space in subsets, where each subset corresponds to an educational group. Then, all students that
choose productivity levels which belong to the same subset are going to be assigned to the same
3Most of the papers in this literature assume that educators want to maximize mean productivity level. I relax
somewhat this assumption by assuming that the school preferred level of productivity for each student is finite but
all the same, significantly higher than what students want.
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educational group and then they will receive the same wage (I assume that the professor perfectly
observes students’ productivity). In this way, the professor chooses how to split students in groups
indirectly when choosing how to partition the productivity space in subsets. For example, a simple
revelation policy is to partition the productivity space in just two subsets: [0,p) and [p,∞). Then
students that choose productivity levels below p are going to be assigned to a group (drop-outs)
and the ones that attain it or surpass it are going to be classified into another group (graduates).
This way of modeling the revelation policy allows an enormous flexibility but at the same time
makes the professor’s problem complex given that he can choose any possible partition of the
productivity space when maximizing his objective function. Fortunately, the set of all potential
revelation policies can be significantly reduced as I show next.
Let’s define a standard as the minimum productivity level for each subset defined by the
professor from the productivity space. As I will show later, individuals only choose productivity
levels that are standards. Then the revelation policy of the professor simplifies to just choosing
the set of productivity levels that are standards. That is, the only real decision that the professor
takes is determining the standards.
This implies that the professor’s revelation policy can be represented by the set S that
contains all the standards.4 As productivity cannot be a negative number then S ⊂ <+. Moreover,
students can always supply zero effort and attain zero productivity. This participation constraint
is introduced by requiring that 0 ∈ S. As an example, if the set S is just S = {0, ŝ}, then
the students are going to be assigned to only two groups. Students with productivity p ≥ ŝ are
assigned to the high productivity group while students with productivity p < ŝ are assigned to
the low productivity group. It is important to note that the set S can include intervals which are
greater than a point. For example, S = {[0, ŝ]} with ŝ 6= 0. In this case, for the whole interval [0, ŝ]
productivity is perfectly revealed. The reason for this is that as there is a continuum of standards
then each group is going to be formed by agents with only one level of productivity. Finally note
that the professor can set S = <+ in which case firms can perfectly observe students’ productivity.
4Strictly speaking, S is allowed to be a finite union of disjoint closed and convex intervals, where an interval can
also be a point.
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3.3 Solution
This section presents the solution of this dynamic game. As it is customary in this type of
game, the problem is solved by backward induction. For that, it is useful to state the timing of
this game:
1) The professor announces his revelation policy, i.e. he announces the set S containing all
the standards. This set S defines a classification function s(·) where s represents the group that
the student is assigned to (a group is defined by its lower standard) and its argument is the student
productivity. Then, a student of ability a is going to be assigned to group st if this is the highest
standard equal or lower than his productivity level.
2) Given the professor’s strategy, each type of student chooses his optimal strategy and
these strategies are represented with the function p(a, S). That is, the productivity level for each
student is going to depend on his type (a) and on the revelation policy chosen by the professor
(S).
3) The professor implements his policy by assigning each student to his corresponding group.
This is done by applying the classification function to the students’ strategy: s(p(a, S)).
4) Firms compute expected productivity for each group and due to perfect competition
wages are set at that level. That is:
wi = E [p(a, S)|s(p(a, S)) = si] ∀i (3.4)
where wi is the wage of group i and si is the standard which defines that group (i.e. the
lower standard of that group).
I now apply backwards induction to solve this game. I start by analyzing the way that
wages are going to be set by firms.
3.3.1 Firms
As said before, due to perfect competition in the labor market, wages are going to be set at




p∗(a, S) ∈ S ∀ a, S (3.5)
This lemma says that students optimal strategies involve choosing a productivity level that
is equal to a standard set by the professor. This statement can be shown by contradiction. Assume
that it is not true. Then there exists at least one agent â for which his optimal productivity level
is p̂ = p(â) and p̂ /∈ S. Then, s(p̂) < p̂ (i.e. his productivity level is higher than the standard
which defines his group). This implies that this agent is optimally choosing to surpass a standard
but not enough to reach a higher standard. But then, ∃ p̃ where p̃ < p̂ and |p̂− p̃| is so small that
s(p̃) = s(p̂). This implies that the agent could be receiving the same wage (as he belongs to the
same group) but providing less effort by choosing p̃ instead of p̂. Hence, p̂ was not optimal and
the result is shown by contradiction.
Corollary 1.
wi = si ∀ i (3.6)
That is, wages for each group are equal to the lower standard of that group. The reason is
that if all agents choose a productivity level equal to a standard, then the expected productivity
for each group is exactly the standard that defines that group.
We now turn to the students’ problem.
3.3.2 Students










x st x ∈ S ∧ x ≤ p (3.8)
wi = E [p(a, S)|s(p(a, S)) = si] (3.9)
That is, students choose productivity in order to maximize utility subject to the assignment
of the student to the group of the highest standard chosen by the professor that the student is able
to attain and the fact that wages are set equal to average productivity for each educational group.
The nice feature of equation 1 is that it shows us that the computation of an equilibrium
in this case of certainty is much simpler than in other settings. The key is that, as students
only choose productivity levels equal to standards, then wages for each group are independent of
students’ strategies. This implies that there is no connection between the problems of different
types of agents and this greatly simplifies the solution of the problem.5






s.t. s(p) = p
w = s(p) (3.10)
Eliminating both constraints and variables w and s:






That is, the student is going to maximize his utility function by choosing a productivity
level equal to some standard set by the professor. This expression shows the real power that the
5In the absence of this result (as it happens in a situation where the professor observes a signal of productivity
rather than its true level) we cannot solve each student problem independently as their mutual decisions are going
to affect the expected productivity for each group (and wages) and consequently, we need to solve the problem of
all agents simultaneously.
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professor enjoys. He can decide the productivity levels that can be chosen by the student and
conveyed to the labor market. If the student chooses another productivity level that is different
from the set of standards determined by the professor, this information cannot be conveyed to
the firms as they do not observe actual productivity but rather which diploma the student has
obtained.
Lemma 2. p∗(a, S) = ArgMin
p∈S
|a− p|
That is, the optimal strategy for each student involves choosing the standard closest to his
ability level. Its proof involves just a number of transformations of the utility function (See the
Appendix for the proof).
The intuition of this result comes from the fact that, if a student were in a situation of
perfect information (S = <+), he would choose his first best productivity level. Given his utility
function, his first best occurs at p∗(a) = a. In a situation where there is imperfect information
in the labor market, the agent is constrained to choose another productivity level if there is no
standard at his first best. It is intuitive to think that he is going to tend to choose the standard
which is closest to his first best. In this model, the utility is symmetric with respect to p = a, then
the students will choose the standard which is closest to his first best a.
In particular, given that 0 ∈ S (a student can always drop out and attain productivity equal
to zero), under no circumstance p(a) > 2a, as in that case the student should just chooses the zero
standard.6 Then:
p(a) ≤ 2a
Throughout this paper, I assume that if an individual is indifferent between choosing two
standards, he is going to choose the higher one. This assumption is going to be implicit each time
that I present the constraint for the professor’s problem about the decision of each student.
6It is more intuitive to think that productivity and wages for this group are not going to be zero but rather the
wage set for raw labor.
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3.3.3 The professor






|z(a)− p(a)|f(a)da s.t. p(a) = ArgMin
p∈S
|a− p| (3.12)




|z(a)− p(a)| = z(a)− p(a)




























p(a)f(a)da s.t. p(a) = ArgMin
p∈S
|a− p| (3.13)
That is, he maximizes mean productivity (or educational output) subject to incentive com-
patibility and participation constraints. He has to decide the set S which contains all the standards.
Assuming that a solution exists, we can clearly see that there are going to be multiplicity
of equilibria in a naive manner. As an example, observe that given certain optimal set S∗ where
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ŝ /∈ S∗ and ŝ > 2ā (recall that ā corresponds to the highest ability level), Ŝ = S∗ ∪ {s̄} is also
going to be optimal. The reason is that the addition of this new standard does not change the
value of the objective function as no agent is going to choose it (as it is so high) and at the same
time it will not break any constraint for the same reason.7 Then, it is useful to trim any set S
that is solution eliminating all the elements of S which are not going to be chosen by any agent in
equilibrium.
It is possible to simplify the problem for the case that the set S has a finite number of
elements. In this case, we can order, from the lowest to the highest, all elements in set S starting
from s0 = 0 < s1 < s2 < . . . < sN . Then, the lowest ability agents will prefer the standard s0
and as the ability level increases, agents start choosing higher standards s1, s2, . . . , sN . Moreover,
defining the agent who is going to be indifferent between two neighboring standards as s̄ij =
si+sj
2 ,




















p (x) f(x)dx (3.14)
As all agents choose the standard which is closest to his ability level:




This means that given a standard si all agents who have ability levels close enough to
that standard are going to choose it. In particular, agents who have ability level lower than the
standard, are going to choose that standard provided it is closest to their first best (a), than the
immediately lower standard si−1. Then, they are going to choose it provided their ability level is
higher than the ability level of the agent who is indifferent between standards si−1 and si (this
7This is exactly the same situation as when we are analyzing a problem of price discrimination with 2 types of
consumers. Typically a solution is presented that consists of two pairs of prices and quantities. All the same, other
solutions could be presented that contain the two pairs of prices and quantities mentioned and other pairs no chosen
in equilibrium by any agent, but there is no point in presenting these other solutions.
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agent is called s̄i−1,i and his ability level is equal to s̄i−1,i =
si−1+si
2 ). In the same way, all agents
who have an ability level higher than si but lower than s̄i,i+1 are going to choose the standard
si. Combining the last three equations, it is possible to eliminate all the p (x) functions and the





































































where I define sN+1 = 2ā− sN . 9
Presenting the problem in this way gives us a useful insight. The problem of deciding
an intermediate standard si is, in its structure, exactly like the problem of deciding any other
standard sj . The only difference between both problems are the values of the neighboring standards
(si+1, si−1 and sj+1, sj−1, respectively) and the values that the F (·) function takes between these
neighboring standards. This implies that, if we can find certain results which are independent of
these elements (the value of the neighboring standards and the F (·) function), then these results
are going to be applied for all intermediate standards.10
Also note that the decision of taking out an intermediate standard from S only affects the
value of the objective function, by changing the mass of agents who were choosing that standard
8Still we have to satisfy that s0 < s1 ... < sN < 2ā





10An intermediate standard is one that it is not the lowest element of S (i.e. it is not zero) and it is not the
highest one.
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(after eliminating it, it is going to be zero) and the mass of agents that choose the neighboring
standards. But the change does not affect the mass of agents who were choosing other standards.
These insights are used to prove the following set of theorems.
Theorem 1. If F (x) = x ∀ x ∈ [0, ā] ⇒ ∀ S / ā ∈ S, S is a solution to 3.13
See the Appendix for the proof.
This theorem says that when the distribution of agents with respect to ability is uniform,
there are multiple solutions and the only requirements that the solution set has to satisfy is that
ā belongs to that set. This implies that, any particular solution, to separate students in just
two groups, N groups or to perfectly disclose information about their productivity, is going to be
optimal (provided ā ∈ S).
To understand the intuition of this result it is convenient to use graphs. Let’s think in a
situation where we have only 2 standards besides 0, i.e. S = {0, s1, s3}. The value of the objective
function can be graphed as Ω is just:





The value of Ω is represented in Figure 3.1 as the grey area delimited by black dash lines. It
can be graphed due to the fact that it is just the sum of the productivity of each group of agents
choosing the same productivity level multiplied by the mass of agents that choose that level. In
the figure, we can see that Ω is composed by two rectangles. The upper represents the total
productivity of agents that are choosing standard s3. This total productivity is just equal to the
productivity that each agent attains (s3) multiplied by the mass of agents choosing this productivity
level (F (ā)−F (s13)). Then, the area of the upper rectangle is just s3 [F (ā)− F (s13)]. Similarly,
the lower rectangle represents the total productivity added by agents that choose to attain the s1
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standard. This is just the productivity that each of them attain (s1) multiplied by the mass of
agents that choose that level (F (s13)−F (s01)). Finally, adding up the area of both rectangles we
get the total productivity of the population of students and this is just Ω.
Suppose we add an intermediate standard exactly in the midpoint between s1 and s3.
That is, we add s2 = s13. The new value of the objective function is represented in Fig-
ure 3.2 as the area composed of three rectangles (delimited by solid grey lines) due to the fact
that there are three different productivity levels that are chosen by agents. The lower rectangle
(s1 [F (s12)− F (s01)]) represents the total productivity of agents that choose standard s1. The
middle rectangle (s2 [F (s23)− F (s12)]) represents total productivity added by agents choosing s2
standard. Finally, the upper rectangle represents total productivity added by agents choosing the
standard s3.
Figure 3.3 presents Ω for the case of two standards and also when we add an intermediate
standard. In this figure, we can see that some agents maintain their decisions with respect to
productivity while others change it and decide to choose the new standard s2. To start with, agents
with ability level lower than s01 were previously choosing the zero standard and they continue doing
so. Secondly, agents with ability level between s01 and s12 were previously choosing the s1 standard
and they continue doing so, as this standard remains the closest to their preferred first best (a).
Similarly, agents with ability level between s23 and ā also do not change their decisions as s3
continues being the closest standard. However, there are agents that do change their productivity
levels.
Agents with ability level close to s2 do change their decision. In particular, agents with
ability level between s12 and s2 were previously choosing standard s1 but now they start choosing
s2. This is the positive effect of adding an intermediate standard. There were some agents that
wanted to attain higher levels of productivity than s1 but they did not do so because the standard
s3 was “too far”. Now, as they have an intermediate option, they increase effort and attain
standard s2. The mass of agents that increase productivity is equal to F (s2) − F (s12) and their
increase in productivity is equal to s2 − s1.
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On the other hand, agents with ability levels between s2 and s23 decrease their productivity
level from s3 to s2. The reason for this change is that previously they reluctantly chose standard
level s3 because they wanted to choose a lower productivity level, but s1 was “too low”. Now, as
they have an intermediate choice, s2, they decrease their productivity from s3 to s2. This negative
effect is equal to the mass of agents that decrease their productivity level (F (s23)− F (s2)) times
how much they decrease productivity (s3 − s2).
Figure 3.4 presents the impact of adding an intermediate standard on the value of the ob-
jective function. In this figure, the positive effect is represented by rectangle I which is delimitated
by solid grey lines. The negative effect is represented by rectangle II delimitated by dash black
lines. If area I is bigger than the area II we should add the intermediate standard. As we can see,
both areas are equal and therefore the net effect is zero. This means that the value of the objective
function is completely independent of whether we add an intermediate standard or not.
The reason why we are able to compare both areas so easily is because we considered the case
of adding a standard that lies exactly in the midpoint between s1 and s3. This makes the increase
that some agents make (s2 − s1 = s13 − s1 = s3+s12 − s1 = s3−s12 ) exactly equal to the decrease
made by those agents that lower their productivity level (s3− s2 = s3− s13 = s3− s3+s12 = s3−s12 ).
However, the key to this result that the net effect is zero lies in the fact that F (·) is linear. This
implies that the number of agents that decrease their productivity level is exactly the same as the
number of agents that increase their productivity level. Moreover, this highlights the crucial role
that F (·) plays in this problem. It is clear to see that under different shapes for F (·) we should
get completely different results.
Theorem 2. If F ′′(x) > 0 ∀ x ∈ [0, ā] ⇒ S∗ = {0, s∗1} is the unique solution to 3.13
See the Appendix for the proof.
The intuition for this result derives from the analysis made above. We just need to think of
the same situation as before (starting with two standards and adding a third one at the midpoint)
but now we acknowledge that, as f (·) is increasing, the mass of individuals that decrease their
productivity level is higher than the mass of those that increase it. This implies that the net effect
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of adding an intermediate standard is negative and then it provides the intuition of why a solution
in this setting will not have any intermediate standard. Hence, in this case, the professor’s optimal
revelation policy consists on choosing one standard and then classifying individuals in two groups
and just conveying this information to the marketplace.
A way to grasp the intuition for this result is by thinking about a situation where there are
many high ability students and a low number of low ability students. Given this situation, the
optimal revelation policy consists on dividing all students in just two groups: high productivity
and low productivity students. As the lower standard for the low productivity group is zero,
applying our previous result, we know that all students who are in this group are going to have
zero productivity and then wages for this group are going to be zero. As a consequence, we can set
a standard really high aiming at the high ability students as the penalty of not attaining it is really
big as they have to choose a zero productivity level (where their first best productivity is high).
Setting this high standard forces students with low and intermediate ability to aim for the zero
productivity standard, but this is a cost which we are willing to pay, as we started assuming that
there was a low number of low ability students and a high number of high ability ones. In short,
by giving them only two choices we are able to extract a high degree of effort from high ability
students that is not possible to extract in a situation where there are intermediate standards which
they can choose from.
Theorem 3. If F ′′ (x) < 0 ∀ x ∈ (0, ā) ⇒ S∗ = {[0, ā]} is the unique solution to 3.13
See the Appendix for the proof.
This theorem states that when f (x) is decreasing, the professor chooses to perfectly reveal
the information about students’ productivity to the labor market. The intuition for this result
comes from the fact that adding an intermediate midpoint standard has a positive net effect as
the mass of students that increase their effort is higher than the mass of students reducing it.
Another way to understand this result is by thinking about a situation where there are
many individuals with low ability and just a few with high ability. In this case, if we think about
setting up a standard and dividing students into two groups, we can clearly see that the standard
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should be set up very low in order not to force the high number of agents with low ability to drop
out. If we just set that standard, individuals with ability higher than that standard will opt to
attain it, but this means that we are inducing them to choose a productivity level lower than their
first best. Clearly, we could improve the solution adding new standards in order to allow them
to choose their first best. This gives the intuition for why perfect information is optimal in this
situation.
Theorem 4. If f (x) is single-peaked ⇒ S∗ = {0, [ŝ, ā]} or S∗ = {0, ŝ} with ŝ > ā
See the Appendix for the proof.
This theorem analyzes the most interesting case where the density of students with respect
to ability is single-peaked. In this case, the optimal set S is going to be equal to {0, [ŝ, ā]} or
S∗ = {0, ŝ} ŝ > ā. Note that these two possibilities in fact correspond to only one characterization
of S. That is, the professor just needs to set a critical standard ŝ and disclose all information
above this standard. This means that S = {0, [s,∞]}. However, recall that we trim the set S in
order to include in this set only productivity levels that are chosen in equilibrium, then depending
on whether ŝ is smaller or greater than ā, the solution will be S∗ = {0, [ŝ, ā]} or S∗ = {0, ŝ} with
ŝ > ā, respectively.
There is a strong intuition for this solution. Given the shape of f (x), the mode of this
density (xm) is at an intermediate value between 0 and ā. This can be interpreted as that the
density is concentrated around the value xm. Then, it makes sense to establish a standard ŝ2 above
this level xm and no intermediate standard below as in this way we are going to give an incentive
to this bulk of students to attain this standard. If we introduced an intermediate standard below
ŝ2, a big fraction of these students would lower their productivity aiming to this new intermediate
standard. However, above ŝ2 the situation is exactly the same as in the case of a decreasing density
and then it makes sense to provide perfect information above that level.
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3.4 Conclusions
This paper explores the problem of an educational authority who has to decide his revelation
policy about students educational attainments. I find that this optimal policy completely depends
on the way in which students are distributed with respect to their optimal productivity level.11
In the model presented, when the density of students with respect to their optimal produc-
tivity level is decreasing, I find that schools should disclose all the information they have about
students’ productivity. In the opposite case, when this density is increasing, the educational au-
thority should classify students only in two groups and just disclose to which group every student
belongs.
Finally, in the most plausible case where this density is single-peaked I show that schools
should define a critical standard and group all individuals below this standard together and per-
fectly disclose information for all students that attain or surpass this standard. This result suggests
that policies that involve full disclosure or just classifying students in two groups can be improved
by a combination of both: full information above a critical standard, no information below it.
11In the model it is assumed that students differ only in ability, but recall that this was just an assumption for
simplicity and clarity of exposition.
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Figure 3.1: Value of the objective function with two standards
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Figure 3.2: Value of the objective function with three standards
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Figure 3.3: Value of the objective function with two and three standards
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Figure 3.4: Net effect of adding an intermediate standard
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Appendix A
Proofs of lemmas and theorems







































Lemma 3. If S contains an interval C with positive mass then taking out the interior elements of
C from S will increase (decrease) Ω if f(x) is increasing (decreasing) over [0, ā]. If f(x) is constant
then removing the interior elements of C from S will not affect Ω.
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Proof
I define sLc and s
H
c as the infimum and supremum of C, respectively. The value of Ω when











As p(x) = x ∀ x ∈ [sLc , sHc
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The value of Ω taking out all the interior values of C is:





















































Define ∆Ω as the increase in the objective function if I eliminate all the interior elements of
C:






















































Next, I change the variable of integration for both integrals in the previous equation. For
the first integral I change it for y = sHc − x and for the second integral I replace the variable of

























f(sHc − y)− f(y + sLc )
]
dy (A.18)
As sHc − y > y + sLc ⇐⇒ s
H
c −sLc
2 > y > 0 and I am integrating from 0 to
sHc −sLc
2 , then
sHc − y > y + sLc over the integration range. This implies that if f ′(x) R 0 ∀ x ∈ [0, ā] then
f(sHc − y) R f(y + sLc ) for all values of y between the integration limits. Finally, if f ′(x) R 0 then
∆Ω R 0 and this completes the proof of this Lemma.
Theorem 1. If F (x) = x ∀ x ∈ (0, ā) ⇒ ∀ S / ā ∈ S, S is a solution to 3.13
Proof
Using lemma 3, I can remove all intervals with positive mass from S and replace them for
its extremes and the value of Ω is not going to change. Doing these replacements and defining s̄






























































(sisi+1 − sisi−1) + s̄ (2ā− ŝ− s̄)
]
(A.22)
Define hi+1 = si+1si and replace in the first term of the previous sum:
N−1∑
i=1
(sisi+1 − sisi−1) =
N−1∑
i=1










hi − h1 −
N−1∑
i=2
hi = hN − h1 = s̄ŝ− s1s0 = s̄ŝ as s0 = 0 (A.24)




[s̄ŝ + s̄ (2ā− ŝ− s̄)] = 1
2
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Then, for any arbitrary set S, if the distribution of agents with respect to ability is uniform,
the value of the objective function is going to only depend on the value of the highest element of
S.1 This implies that the only requirement for a set S to be optimal is that its higher element has
to be chosen optimally. But the problem of choosing that standard optimally is just equivalent to
the problem of choosing the standard optimally in a situation where the professor can only set one























1Remember that we trim all elements of S that are not going to be chosen by any agent.
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Setting Ω′(s̄) = 0 and solving for s̄:
s̄∗ = ā (A.30)
Moreover, Ω′′(s̄) = −1 ∀ s̄ and then s̄∗ = ā is its unique maximum.
Theorem 2. If F ′′(x) > 0 ∀ x ∈ (0, ā) ⇒ Exists a unique solution and it is S∗ = {0, s∗1}
Proof
Using lemma 3 I know that no solution set S includes an interval with positive mass as the
value of the objective function will increase if we remove the interior elements of these intervals.
Next, I will show that in any solution I cannot have more than two standards. For that,
suppose that there exists more than two standards in a solution. Then, there should exists an
intermediate standard that I call s2. I call the neighbouring standards as s1 and s3, where s1 <
s2 < s3. In a solution, the standard s2 has to be set optimally given all the other standards and
in particular, s1 and s3. In particular, the following condition has to hold:





p(x)f(x)dx where p(x) = Arg Min
p∈S
|p− x| (A.31)





















As in this problem s2 is constrained to lie between s1 and s3, then the first and last term
of the RHS of the previous expression are independent of the value of s2. Then,















Moreover, using the constraint about p(x):
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s2 = Arg Max
s1≤s2≤s3











If s2 maximizes this function, it has to minimize the function multiplied by − 1s3−s1 :
































I evaluate g(·) at s1 and s3:





































































+ (1− α)s1 + s2
2
)
∀ α ∈ (0, 1) (A.45)












































































∀ α ∈ (0, 1) (A.49)
g (s2 ∈ (s1, s3)) > g(s2 = s1) = g(s2 = s3) as s1 < s2 < s3 ⇒ α ∈ (0, 1)
This implies that this function is minimizied at s1 or s3. Given equation A.40, this implies
that s2 = s1 or s2 = s3. But I started assuming that s1 < s2 < s3. Then, by contradiction, I have
showed that there is no solution that has an intermediate standard and then any solution can have
at most two standards.
As s0 = 0 ∈ S, then the solution set S is going to have another standard s1 besides s0, as
a solution set S containing only s0 can easily be improved choosing any s1 ∈ (0, 2ā). Finally, s1
is going to be set solving the same problem that a professor that can only classify two students is
going to face. That is,








The solution to this problem exists and it is unique. This can be shown from the following
properties of Ω(s1):











Ω′ (s1 = 0) = F (ā) > 0 (A.52)












= −āf (ā) < 0 (A.53)













< 0 ∀ s1 ∈ [0, 2ā) (A.54)
As Ω′ (s1) is positive at s1 = 0, negative at s1 = 2ā and decreasing over this range, then
there is one and only one value of s1 for which this derivative is equal to zero.
Theorem 3. If F ′′ (x) < 0 ∀ x ∈ (0, ā) ⇒ S∗ = [0, ā] is the unique solution to 3.13
Proof
Suppose that there exists a solution set S for which there exists an interval with positive
mass C such that C = (sLc , s
H




c ∈ S and C ∩ S = ∅. Using lemma 3 we know that
including all the interior elements of this interval to S will increase the value of the objective
function. Then, by contradiction the result is shown.
Theorem 4. If f (x) is single-peaked ⇒ S∗ = {0, [ŝ, ā]} or S∗ = {0, ŝ} with ŝ > ā
Proof
To show this theorem, I use other results stablished in previous theorems. In order to do
so, I proceed sequentially showing the following results for this case where f (x) is single-peaked.
1) S cannot include neither an interval with positive mass in the increasing region of f (x)
nor more than one standard (besides zero) in this region.
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2) S cannot contain the extrems of an interval with positive mass of agents but not all the
interior elements, in the decreasing region of f (x).
3) S cannot includes an standard at xm.2
4) S has to include an interval above xm.
5) S cannot contain an standard in the increasing region of f (x).
Combining these five results, I conclude that S is composed only by zero and a closed and
convex interval above xm. If ŝ is higher than ā then, S is just {0, ŝ}. Now, I show these five results.
1) S cannot include neither an interval with positive mass in the increasing region of f (x)
nor more than one standard (besides zero) in this region.
Proof:
Given lemma 3, we know that the set S will not include an interval in the increasing region
of f (x) as replacing it by its extremes, the solution will be improved. Secondly, a solution to this
problem cannot contain two standards besides zero in the increasing region of f (x) as the proof
of theorem 2 shows that the solution can be improved by eliminating any intermediate standards.
2) S cannot contain the extrems of an interval with positive mass of agents but not all the
interior elements, in the decreasing region of f (x).
Proof:
Using lemma 3, we know that a solution cannot include the extremes of an interval but not
all the interior elements as the solution can be improved by including these interior elements.
3) S cannot includes an standard at xm.
Proof:
Combining results 1) and 2), I know that any solution can have (at most) an standard in
the decreasing region of f (x) (besides zero), an standard at xm and an interval above xm. Now,
I will show that there is no solution with an standard at xm. To do that, I assume that there
exists a solution where the set S has an standard at xm. Then, I cannot have an standard in the
increasing region of f (x) (as it would be an intermediate standard) and moreover the set S will
2xm corresponds to the mode of the ability distribution.
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include the whole decreasing region of f (x). This implies that the solution will be S = [ŝ, ā] where
ŝ = xm. As this is an optimal solution, there is no change that that can be made over the set
S that will increase the value of the objective function Ω. In particular, the solution cannot be
improved by increasing the lower extreme of the interval [ŝ, ā]. Now, I compute the first derivative





ŝf (x) dx +
∫ ā
ŝ










xf (x) dx (A.55)














− ŝf (ŝ) (A.56)




































< x < xm (A.58)
This last result implies that I can improve the solution by increasing ŝ and then the result
is shown by contradiction. Hence, I conclude that a the solution set S cannot include an standard
at xm.
4) S has to include an interval above xm.
Proof:
Suppose that is not the case. Then, given the results obtained above, I will have a solution
set with only one standard, that I call s1, in the increasing region of f (x) besides the standard
that lies at zero. However, this cannot be a solution, as I can just add another standard s2 in the
decreasing region of f (x) and its only effect is going to be to make some agents that were choosing
s1 to choose s2, and then the solution will be improved. Then, this was not a solution and by
contradiction the result is shown.
5) S cannot contain an standard in the increasing region of f (x).
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Proof:
Combining the four results presented above, I know that S is going to include only one

























xf (x) dx (A.59)
st s1 < xm < s2
I want to show that s∗1 = 0 (i.e. there is no standard in the increasing region of f (x) besides
zero). To do so, let’s start assuming that s∗1 > 0 (remember that s
∗
2 has to be greater than xm).



































− s2f (s2) (A.60)
∂Ω
∂s2

















































) ∀ ( s1+s22 , s2). This implies that I am integrating a function that is negative over





But I initially assumed that (s1, s2) was a solution. Clearly it cannot be the case that ∂Ω∂s2


















































































I call this objective function W (s1). Using the previous equation:

































On the other side, I know that f ′ (x) > 0 ∀ x < xm and that s1+s22 < xm then f ′ (x) >
0 ∀ s < s1+s22 . Similarly, F ′′ (x) > 0 ∀ x < s1+s22 . This implies that:
αF (a) + (1− α)F (b) > F (αa + (1− α) b) ∀ α ∈ (0, 1) (A.69)
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, a = s
∗
1




2 the right hand side of this inequality
becomes:


















































































2 < xm and s
∗
1 > 0.
Combining the two results obtained above, I conclude that there cannot be a solution with
s∗1 > 0. Then, by contradiction it is shown that s
∗
1 = 0 and then that there is no standard below
xm besides zero.
Additionally, I can assert that the solution exists as I am maximiziming a continuous function
on a closed and convex set.3
Moreover, it can be shown that this solution is unique. To do that, I need to get equate the
first derivative of Ω with respect to s2 equal to zero (I call this value s∗2) and then I can check that
for all values of s2 lower than s∗2 I know that this first derivative is positive and that for all values
of s2 that are higher than s∗2 the first derivative first is negative and once that they are higher
than 2ā the derivative become zero (as the value of the function remains at zero).
3To see that, just think that instead of maximizing the function subject that xm < s2, assume that xm < s2 ≤ 2ā.
The solution of both problems is equivalent as s2 is going to be always smaller or equal than 2ā as if not, all agents
are going to choose the zero standard.
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